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JURISDICTION
Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2A-3(2)(h), the Utah Court of
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over:

(h) cases transferred to

the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

This Court,

accordingly, has jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal which pertain to respondent Okubo
are:
1.

Whether the trial court properly dismissed the

plaintiffs1 Complaint against Dr. Okubo on the grounds that the
plaintiffs failed to procure the expert testimony necessary to
etablish Dr. Okubo's alleged breach of the standard of care
relevant to the case.
2.

Whether the trial court's summary judgment dismissal

of the plaintiffs' Complaint against Dr. Okubo was proper based
on the grounds that Dr. Okubo's allegedly negligent conduct was
not, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of Tiffany Ruth
Butterfield1s death.
3.

Whether the trial court properly denied the

plaintiffs1 motion to extend the discovery period.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Dr. Okubo hereby incorporates by reference the statement
of the case found on pages 2 and 3 of Dr. Nickol's brief.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff, Tiffany Ruth Butterfield ("Tiffany"), was

born June 30, 1984.

Defendant David Okubo ("Dr. Okubo") examined

Tiffany as part of a routine pediatric assessment shortly
following her birth.

Dr. Okubo's initial examination revealed

that Tiffany was healthy and normal.
2.

On July 4, four days after her birth, Tiffany was

taken to the Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital Emergency Clinic.
The emergency chart, recorded at the time of that visit, indicated
that Tiffany was experiencing decreased activity accompanied with
congestion in the nose which was improved with bulb sunctioning.
Defendant Thomas Nickol ("Dr. Nickol") examined plaintiff at that
time and again assessed the child as normal.
3.

Tiffany's first and only visit to Dr. Okubo's office

occurred on July 16, 1984.

(Deposition of Angela Butterfield, at

pp. 20, 2 3 and 24, attached as Addendum "A".

See also Transcript

of December 23, 1987 Hearing, p. 7, line 9.)
4.

During the July 16 visit, Dr. Okubo obtained a

history from Mrs. Butterfield and examined the child.

His office

notes indicate that Tiffany had some history of "gasps" without
any skin discoloration or reflux.

Dr. Okubo's notes also indicate

that Tiffany had an active, demanding temperment.
5.

The Butterfields sought the services of another

physician following the July 16 visit with Dr. Okubo.

Dr. Okubo

never saw Tiffany again and never conferred with the Butterfields
after the July 16 visit.

See Transcript of December 23, 1987
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Hearing, p. 7, line 11. The Butterfields had decided shortly
after the July 16 visit that Dr. Okubo would no longer be
Tiffany's pediatrician.
6.

(Addendum "A".)

One month after the July 16 visit, on August 16,

1984, Tiffany was again taken to the emergency room of Jordan
Valley Hospital.

She was again examined by Dr. Nickol. The

Butterfields reported to Dr. Nickol that Tiffany was experiencing
an irregular breathing pattern with one occasion on which Tiffany
did not breathe for four seconds, although no skin discoloration
was noted on that occasion.
Dr. Nickol assessed

(See Addendum B of Nickol Brief.)

the child as normal for her age and suggested

to the parents that they watch the child carefully to observe any
increased respiratory distress with cyanosis or blue
discoloration.

Dr. Nickol suggested to the Butterfields that

Tiffany be taken back to Dr. Okubo in the latter part of July or
early August for a two-month checkup.

The Butterfields did not go

back to Dr. Okubo.
7.

On August 31, 1984, the Butterfields took plaintiff

to Dr. Monty McClellan ("Dr. McClellan"), a family practitioner,
for a routine checkup.

Dr. McClellan again saw Tiffany on

September 27, November 5, November 30, and December 14, 1984.
(Deposition of Monty McClellan, pp. 7-11, attached hereto as
Addendum "B".)
8.

On December 20, Tiffany died from sudden infant death

syndrome while at home.

From the time of Dr. Okubo's last contact

with Tiffany on July 16 and her death on December 20, over five
-3-

months had elapsed,
9.

On December 10, 19 87, Dr. Okubo moved for summary

judgment against defendant.

(R. pp. 116-125.)

In essence, Dr.

Okubo moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
Butterfields had not obtained a pediatrician or any other expert
witness to testify that Dr. Okubo had deviated from the standard
of care in his treatment of Tiffany at the trial scheduled to
begin on January 11, 1988. At the time the motion was filed, the
Butterfields had indicated by answer to interrogatories that they
intended to rely on the testimony of Dr. Monty McClellan to
establish what they alleged was the breach of the standard of care
in the treatment of their daughter.

(See Answer to Interrogatory

11, attached as Addendum "F" to Nickol Brief.)

During his

deposition, however, Dr. McClellan admitted that he had never been
requested by the Butterfields to testify at trial and did not
intend to testify at trial.
attached as Addendum "B".)

(Dr. McClelland Deposition, p. 47,
Plaintiffs conceded at the summary

judgment hearing that they did not intend to rely upon Dr.
McClellan to provide expert medical testimony.

(See Transcript of

Summary Judgment Hearing, R. 212 at p. 17.)
10.

In contrast to the Butterfields, Dr. Okubo had

produced an affidavit from Dr. Dennis Nielson stating that Dr.
Okubo did not deviate from the applicable standard of care in
failing to recommend the use of a home apnea monitor even if the
Butterfields1 testimony is believed.

Dr. Nielson is a Board

certified Utah pediatrician and Director of the Pediatric
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Pulmonary Function Laboratory at the University of Utah Hospital
and Primary Children's Medical Center.

He is also a member of the

Sudden Infant Death Advisory Council of the Utah State Department
of Health.

(R. pp. 55-56.

See also Nielson Affidavit, attached

as Addendum "Cff. )
11.

On December 21, 1987, 11 days after the motion for

summary judgment had been filed and two days before it was to be
heard, the Butterfields obtained an affidavit from Dr. H. Barry
Jacobs in which Dr. Jacobs alleges that Dr. Okubo fell below the
standard of care in his treatment of Tiffany.
Affidavit, attached hereto as Addendum "D".)

(See Jacobs
Although plaintiffs

claim that the affidavit of Dr. Jacobs was delivered on December
22, 1987 at the law offices of counsel for Dr. Okubo, that
particular fact was disputed at the lower court hearing of December
23, 1987. Counsel for Dr. Okubo worked at his office until around
6:00 p.m. on December 22, 1987 and had not received a copy of Dr.
Jacobs' affidavit nor was he aware of the affidavit by that time.
The following day, counsel went directly from his home to the court
for the December 2 3 hearing and that was the first that he saw of
the Dr. Jacobs affidavit.

Counsel called his office to inquire

whether a copy of the affidavit had been delivered and no one at
the office could locate a copy of the affidavit.

(See Transcript

of December 23, 1987 Hearing at pp. 6, 15 and 28.)
12.

The trial court granted Dr. Okubo's summary judgment

motion as well as summary judgment motions filed by the other
defendants, on January 27, 1988, ruling that the Butterfields had

-5-

not established through competent or qualified expert testimony
that Dr- Okubo breached the requisite standard of care required of
him.

(R. pp. 204-206, and attached as Addendum "A" to Nickol

Brief.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AGAINST DR. OKUBO ON
THE GROUNDS THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAD FAILED
TO PRODUCE COMPETENT MEDICAL EXPERT
TESTIMONY.
A.

The Requirement of Competent Medical Expert Testimony
Generally.

Plaintiffs concede that they need to produce expert
testimony in order to establish the standard of care owed by
defendants.

This has long been the holding of the Utah Supreme

Court:
In the majority of malpractice cases, the
plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to
establish [the requisite] standard of care.
Expert testimony is required because the
nature of the profession removes the
particularities of its practice from the
knowledge and understanding of the average
citizen.
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 at 352 (Utah 1980).
Another general rule that has been applied in Utah and
which has been fully explained in the brief of defendant Dr.
Thomas Nickol on pages 16 and 17 is that ordinarily a physician
from one school of medicine is not competent to testify as an
expert in a malpractice action against a physician of another
school.

See Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245 (Utah 1984).
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An

exception to this general rule exists when there has been a
showing that the medical expert offered by the plaintiff has the
knowledge and familiarity with the standard of care and treatment
commonly practiced by physicians engaged in the defendant's
specialty.
B.

Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337 at 339 (Utah 1987).
Plaintiffs' Medical Expert Testimony.

As was discussed in the Statement of Facts and is also
covered in the brief of defendant Dr. Thomas Nickol, the
plaintiffs' first proposed expert, Dr. McClellan, clearly stated
in his deposition that he did not anticipate testifying as an
expert in this case and was never asked to do so. Plaintiffs'
counsel clearly represented to the court at the December 23, 1987
hearing that plaintiffs did not intend to use Dr. McClellan as an
expert in the case.

Consequently, the only medical expert

testimony presented by plaintiffs was the affidavit of Dr. Jacobs
which was presented for the first time at the hearing on December
23.

Consequently, the adequacy of the affidavit in establishing

the competency of Dr. Jacobs and the timeliness of the
presentation of the affidavit are critical to a determination of
whether the trial court correctly ruled that there had been no
competent medical testimony presented.
C.

The Affidavit of Dr. Jacobs is Insufficient to
Establish Competent Medical Testimony in This Case.

The analysis of whether an affidavit in response to a
motion for summary judgment can successfully raise a genuine issue
of material fact begins with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).
That rule states five requirements of affidavits which respond to
-7-

motions for summary judgment:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made [1] on personal knowledge, [2] shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and [3] shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein.
[4] Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavit or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must [5]
set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does
not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(numbering supplied).

The Jacobs affidavit fails to contain the

type of particularized, affirmative showing necessary under Rule
56(e), as will be fully discussed and analyzed below:
1.

Dr. Jacobs1 Claim of Experience in Pediatrics.

Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit makes it clear that he is not a
pediatrician but a general surgeon licensed to practice that
specialty in Maryland.

He nevertheless attempts to establish his

competence in pediatrics with the following statement in paragraph

. . . I have past experience in . . .
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in
private practice and hospitals, including
the Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C.
The Arizona case of Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz.App.
1978), considers the question of whether such a claim is
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sufficient to give one specialist competence to testify against a
physician in another specialty:
In the present case, none of the plaintiff's
witnesses demonstrated any significant
familiarity with the medical standards to
which an orthopedic surgeon must adhere.
The witness who had perhaps the greatest
opportunity to acquire knowledge of
orthopedic procedures was Dr. Rocovich.
Although a neurosurgeon, he had served on
the staff of an orthopedic hospital, had
discussed lumbar diskograms with orthopedic
surgeons, and had sometimes worked with
orthopedic surgeons on the same patient. We
do not believe that these facts alone showed
such a familiarity with the orthopedic
standards of care as to require a finding
that the trial judge abused his discretion
in refusing to admit Dr. Rocovichfs
testimony.
558 P.2d at 346-47.

If anything, the Dr. Rocovich who was

referred to in the above quote had a much more specific and
detailed claim to the kind of competence necessary to testify
against a member of another specialty than does Dr. Jacobs. Dr.
Jacobs doesn't suggest that he has treated the SIDS related
symptomatology with Utah pediatricians.
Even without the guidance provided by Gaston, it would be
apparent that Dr. Jacobs' reference to his experience at the
Children's Hospital is not an "affirmative" showing of competence
within the meaning of Rule 56(e).

Dr. Jacobs does not indicate

what kind of pediatrics experience he has. He does not indicate
how many of his patients were children.

He does not indicate what

kind of experience he had at the Children's Hospital in Washington,
D.C.

He certainly doesn't indicate any expertise with sudden

infant death syndrome.

Nowhere does he indicate that he is
-9-

familiar with the use of home apnea monitors.

(See Addendum "E".)

In contrast, Dr. Okubo had presented to the court the affidavit of
Dr. Dennis Nielson, a Board certified Utah pediatrician and
Director of the Pediatric Pulmc>nary Function Laboratory at the
University of Utah Hospital and Primary Children's Medical Center.
In addition, he is a member of the Sudden Infant Death Syndrome
Advisory Council for the State Department of Health.

His affidavit

very clearly presented to the court competent expert medical
testimony that Dr. Okubo did not deviate from the standard of care
required of him even if all of the testimony of Mr. and Mrs.
Butterfield is believed.
In analyzing whether Dr. Jacobs has affirmatively shown
his competence to testify as to the matters stated in his
affidavit, it is important to remember that Dr. Jacobs has an
enhanced obligation to show his competence because he is not a
pediatrician.

What might be a satisfactory "affirmative showing"

of competence in an affidavit from another pediatrician like Dr.
Okubo will not be sufficient in an affidavit from a general
surgeon like Dr. Jacobs.

Because of the requirements of Burton

and Martin, supra, Dr. Jacobs1 alleged showing of competence must
be especially persuasive.
2.

Dr. Jacobs1 Claim of Familiarity With the
Standard of Care Required in Pediatrics in 1984.

Dr. Jacobs' further attempt to affirmatively show his
competence is contained in paragraph 3 of the affidavit:
I am familiar with the Standard of Care,
applicable in 1984, required in pediatrics

-10-

To simply claim, without explanation, to be familiar with the
standard of care required in another medical specialty is
insufficient to establish a showing of competence on the part of a
physician from a different specialty,
295 (Ga.App. 1985).

Bethea v. Smith, 336 S.E.2d

In Bethea, the plaintiff sued his orthopedic

surgeon for alleged negligent treatment of the plaintiff's
fractured right ankle.
judgment.

The orthopedic surgeon moved for summary

The plaintiff resisted the motion for summary judgment

by providing the court with an affidavit from a podiatrist opining
that the orthopedic surgeon was negligent.
the motion for summary judgment.

The trial court denied

On review, the Georgia Court of

Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant's summary judgment
should have been granted because the affidavit from the podiatrist
was not sufficient to set forth the podiatrist's competence to
testify against an orthopedic surgeon.

Interestingly, the

podiatrist's alleged showing of competence is very similar to the
showing of competence with which Dr. Jacobs attempts in his
affidavit:
The affiant set forth his qualifications and
stated that [1] he was familiar with the
standard of care and treatment practiced by
"the medical profession generally" with
respect to the type of diagnosis and
treatment involved in the care of appellee
by appellant Bethea, [2] that he had
examined appellee and appellee's medical
records, [3] and that he had personal
knowledge of the facts of the case. [4] It
was the affiant's opinion "that the standard
of care as it pertains to the medical
profession generally, that being the degree
of skill and care employed by the medical
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profession generally under similar
conditions and like surrounding
circumstances was not followed in the course
and treatment of [appellee] by [appellant
Bethea]."
336 S.E.2d at 296-297.

Like the podiatrist in Bethea, Dr. Jacobs

states, with very little explanation, that he is familiar with the
standard of care required of pediatricians, and he further alleges
with little elaboration that the defendants in a medical
malpractice action have fallen below the standard of care required
of them.

Such allegations were properly found inadequate in

Bethea.
Dr. Jacobs' claim that he is "familiar with the Standard
of Care, applicable in 1984 required in pediatrics . . ."
establishes no more than a passing knowledge of the specialty -insufficient to qualify Dr.
against Dr. Okubo.

Jacobs as an expert to testify

"More than a casual familiarity with the

specialty of the defendant physician is required" in order to
qualify a physician in one specialty to testify against a
physician in another specialty.
at 346.
1984).

Gaston v. Hunter, supra, 588 P.2d

See also, Connelly v. Kortz, 689 P.2d 728, 730 (Colo.App.
At least one court has held that before an expert from one

specialty may testify against an expert from another specialty,
the former must be equally as familiar with the standard of care
required of the latter as a practitioner of the latter specialty.
Whitehurst v. Boehm, 255 S.E.2d 761 (N.C.App. 1979).

Nothing in

Dr. Jacobs' affidavit establishes that he is "equally familiar"
with the standard of care required of Utah pediatricians.

-12-

3.

The Affidavit is Defective Because it Fails to
Address the Question of Whether a General Surgeon
Would Treat The Infant Plaintiff With the Same
Procedures a Pediatrician Would Employ.

It is significant that nothing in Dr. Jacobs' affidavit
states or even suggests that the method of treatment for Tiffany
Butterfield would be the same for a general surgeon as for a
pediatrician.

Dr. Jacobs does not even address this question, yet

it is the sine quo non for the admissibility of testimony by one
physician against a physician from a different specialty in Utah
and most other states.

This rule was specifically upheld in

Burton v. Youngblood, supra, where the court upheld the rejection
of a specialist's testimony when he could not state unquivocally
that an occular plastic surgeon would employ the same procedures
to perform an upper eyelid blepharoplasty as would be used by a
plastic surgeon.
The "common method of treatment" prerequisite to
admissibility was also enforced by the Arizona Court of Appeals in
Gaston v. Hunter, supra.

The court rejected the testimony of a

neurosurgeon against the defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, even
though the neurosurgeon testified that the criteria for
intervention in neurosurgery and orthopedic surgery for disk
disease (the condition for which the defendant had treated the
plaintiff) were the same.

For similar holdings, see Caro v.

Bumpus, 491 P.2d 606 (Colo.App. 1971) (Rejecting the testimony of
doctors of medicine in a malpractice action against an osteopathic
physician and surgeon); James v. Falk, 360 P.2d 546 (Or. 1961)
(Reciting the general rule that one physician may testify against
-13-

another physician from a different specialty when both schools of
practice follow the same precepts).

The failure of Dr. Jacobs'

affidavit to even address the issue of whether a general surgeon
would treat Tiffany's breathing symptoms the same way a
pediatrician would makes it fatally deficient.
4.

The Affidavit is Deficient Because it Fails to
Establish Dr. Jacobs' Familiarity With the Local
Standard of Care.

Still another reason the Jacobs affidavit is deficient is
that it fails to establish Dr. Jacobs' familiarity with the standard of care owed by pediatrians in Utah or similar localities.
The affidavit says nothing about Dr. Jacobs' familiarity with
Utah/similar locality pediatric practice.

Dr. Jacobs states only

that he is licensed in the State of Maryland and that he has
experience in pediatrics having cared for patients in the
Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C.

Certainly, this is not

enough to make Dr. Jacobs qualified to testify as to the standard
of care owed by a pediatrician in Utah or a similar locality.

The

failure to lay such a foundation for Dr. Jacobs' testimony is
fatal.

Utah courts have long held that a witness physician may

not testify against a malpractice defendant physician unless the
witness can establish his familiarity with the standard of care
owed in the defendant physician's community or in a similar
locality.

Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474 (Utah

1979); Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978).

Similar holdings

from other jurisdictions are so numerous that reference can only
be made to a few of the more recent cases.
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Loftus v. Hayden, 391

A.2d 749 (Del. 1978); Koch v. Gorrilla, 552 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir.
1977); Brazil v. U.S., 484 F.Supp. 986 (D.C.Ala. 1979); Samuels v.
Doctors Hospital, Inc., 414 F.Supp. 1124 (D.C.La. 1976); Searcy v.
Manganhas, 415 N.E.2d 142 (Ind.App. 1981); Holmes v. Elliott, 443
So.2d 825 (Miss.

1983); Ayres by Ayres v. Rutherford Hosp., Inc.,

689 S.W.2d 155 (Tenn.App. 1984); Ives v. Redford, 252 S.E.2d 315
(Va. 1979).

Dr. Jacobs' affidavit doesn't even attempt to

suggest, however, that he is familiar with the standard of care
owed in Utah or that the standard of care owed in Maryland is
similar to the standard of care owed in Utah.

This lack of

foundation testimony provided the trial court with still
additional grounds to find the Jacobs affidavit incompetent.
D.

Dr. Jacobs' Affidavit Was Not Timely Served.

Even if Dr. Jacobs' affidavit could establish his
competence to testify against a Utah pediatrician, the affidavit
should be rejected because it was not timely served.

Dr. Okubo

hereby refers to pages 24 through 27 of Dr. Nickol's brief
wherein the requirements for service of affidavits in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment are set forth.

As explained

there, Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require
service of opposing affidavits on the day prior to a motion for
summary judgment hearing.

Counsel for Dr. Okubo worked at his

office until approximately 6:00 p.m. on December 22, the day prior
to the December 23 hearing.

He never received a copy of Dr.

Jacobs' affidavit, nor was a copy of the affidavit left with anyone
at his law office.

The following day, counsel went directly from
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his home to the hearing.
Jacobs affidavit.

It was there that he first saw the Dr.

He called his office to inquire whether a copy

of the affidavit had been delivered.

At the time of the call,

shortly before the hearing, no one could locate a copy of Dr.
Jacobs' affidavit.

All of these facts were made known to the trial

court at the time of the hearing.

(See Transcript of December 23,

1987 Hearing at pp. 6, 15 and 28.)

A copy of the affidavit was

discovered in counsel's office following his return from the
hearing, but there was no indication it had been delivered the day
before or who might have received it.
Admittedly, Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure set forth several means by which service may properly be
accomplished:
Delivery of a copy within this rule means:
Handing it to the attorney or to the party,
or leaving it at his office with his clerk
or other person in charge thereof; or, if
there is no one in charge, leaving it in a
comspicuous place therein; or if the office
is closed or the person to be served has no
office, leaving it at his dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing
therein.
Notwithstanding the multitude of possible means of service,
however, the obvious intent of the rule is that counsel be
provided with a copy of the affidavit early enough to be able to
review it before the scheduled hearing.

To leave the document in

a law office, after usual business hours for a hearing at 9:00
a.m. the following morning clearly violates the intent of the rule
if not the actual requirements itself.
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Counsel does not know how

or when the delivery of the affidavit occurred, but if it was
delivered the day before the hearing, it was done well after 5:00
p.m. and was not left with anyone who could be classified as being
"in charge of the office," nor did it appear to be left in a
"conspicuous place."

Consequently, it is the position of Dr.

Okubo that the service was clearly not proper, and the trial court
could justifiably refuse to accept it.
E.

The Trial Court Has Broad Discretion to Determine the
Competency of an Expert Witness.

The final point to be made with regard to the affidavit
and testimony of Dr. Jacobs is that a Utah trial court is granted
considerable discretion in determining whether an expert is
qualified to give his opinion on a particular matter.

Dixon v.

Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1981); Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall,
636 P.2d 481 (Utah 1981).

The ruling of a trial court on the

admissibility of testimony should not be lightly disturbed on
appeal, if at all, unless it clearly appears that the court was in
error.

Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336, 340

(Utah 1979).

The trial court!s decision to reject Dr. Jacobs'

affidavit cannot be said to be an abuse of discretion for the many
reasons that have been previously addressed in this brief.

In

addition, it should be noted that the court did have the evidence
presented by the affidavit of Dr. Dennis Nielson, a Board cetified
pediatrician, who clearly had the competence to testify as to the
standard of care required of Dr. Okubo.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE ALLEGED
MISCONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS WAS NOT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' INJURY WAS
CORRECT IN LIGHT OF PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO
PRODUCE COMPETENT EXPERT TESTIMONY. EVEN IF
SUCH LANGUAGE WAS ERROR, IT WAS HARMLESS ERROR.
Point II of the Butterfield brief assigns error to the
trial court's Order and Summary Judgments.

The Butterfields find

language in the Order which they interpret as a finding that the
Butterfields caused Tiffany's death.

The Butterfields claim that

such a finding is not supported by the evidence, and that it
constitutes reversible error.
briefly.

This argument may be disposed of

First, the court's observation that "there were

intervening events that superceded any misconduct on the part of"
any of the defendants was not so much a finding that the
Butterfields were at fault as it was an attempt to exonerate the
defendants.

(See Nickol Addendum "A".)

The implication of the

quoted language is that there was no action or omission on the
part of the defendants which could be the proximate cause of
Tiffany's death.

In this regard the court is referred to Point II

of the brief of defendant Dr. Nickol, pp. 27-30, where this issue
is thoroughly discussed.
With specific reference to Dr. Okubo on the issue of
proximate cause, the court had uncontroverted medical record
evidence before it that Dr. Okubo had not seen the infant
plaintiff from July 16, 1984 all the way up to the infant's death
on December 20, 1984, or a period of five full months.

The

plaintiffs admitted that shortly after the visit of July 16 that
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they had decided to transfer the pediatric care for Tiffany from
Dr. Okubo to the general physician, Dr. McClellan.

They then took

Tiffany to see Dr. McClellan on five occasions before her death,
including August 31, September 27, November 5, November 30, and
December 14, 1984. This clear remoteness of time from Dr. Okubo's
treatment, together with the testimony presented by Dr. Dennis
Nielson regarding Dr. Okubo's complete compliance with the
standard of care expected of a pediatrician, presented the court
with enough evidence to conclude that there were "intervening
events" that must have superceded any misconduct, if any, on the
part of defendants and which thereby insulate defendant Dr. Okubo
from being the proximate cause of Tiffany's death.
Even if the court's finding concerning proximate cause
was made in the absence of sufficient uncontroverted facts, the
language in the court's order about proximate causation and
intervening events does not constitute reversible error,
independent grounds exist to uphold the lower court's decision.
The court had sufficient medical evidence to conclude that the
defendant's conduct was not responsible for the infant's death,
especially in light of plaintiffs' failure to produce competent
expert testimony to the contrary.

Even if the ruling as to

proximate cause was in error, it is well established that an
erroneous finding of fact that is unnecessary to support a court's
decision is not grounds for reversal.

Wright v. Wright, 623 P.2d

97 (Haw.App. 1981); Newcum v. Lawson, 684 P.2d 534 (N.M.App.
1984); and Ratzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 646 P.2d
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586 (N.M.App. 1982).

Even where a motion presents a trial judge

with a pure question of law, and the judge erroneously enters a
finding of fact, such a mistake is not reversible error.
v. Yacte, 592 P.2d 57 (Idaho 1979).

Gmeiner

A finding that is unsupported

by evidence is harmless error where a contrary finding would not
affect the ultimate decision.

Renfro v. J.D. Coqqlns Co., 378

P.2d 130 (N.M. 1963) .
Where there is sufficient evidence to support all of the
material and decisive findings in an order or judgment, the
presence of unsupported or immaterial findings is of no
consequence.

McLeod v. Keith, 417 P.2d 861 (Wash.2d 1966).

There

is ample evidence to support the court's finding that the
Butterfields were unable to produce competent medical testimony to
rebut the testimony of defendants' experts.

An unsupported finding

of fact cannot amount to reversible error under such circumstances.
POINT III.
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO CONTINUE THE
DISCOVERY PERIOD. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, EVEN
IF THE REFUSAL TO CONTINUE WAS ERROR,
INDEPENDENT GROUNDS EXIST TO AFFIRM THE
TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The Butterfields claim that the trial court erred by
refusing to grant their last-minute motion to extend the discovery
cutoff.

The background of the Butterfields' motion is as follows.

On August 25, 1987, the trial court issued a scheduling order
requiring all discovery to be completed by December 11, 1987.
Defendant Okubo answered the Butterfields' first set of interrogatories on December 3, 1987, in which Okubo's expert witness was
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designated.

The Butterfields' only justification for extending the

discovery deadline as to defendant Okubo is that the Butterfields
did not receive Dr. Okubo's discovery responses until eight days
before the discovery cutoff.

The Butterfields claim that they

wanted to depose Okubo's expert and needed more time to do so. The
trial court's refusal to grant the motion to extend the discovery
deadline as to defendant Okubo was proper for two reasons. First,
as pointed out in the brief of defendant Nickol, the trial court's
decisions pertaining to discovery orders must be given broad
latitude by this court.

First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, of

Salt Lake City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984).

Trial

courts must be afforded significant discretion to enter such
discovery orders as they deem necessary.
P.2d 558 (N.M.App. 1986).

DeTevis v. Aragon, 727

See also cases cited in brief of Dr.

Nickol, p. 33. The trial court was in the best position to
evaluate whether an extension of the discovery deadline was justified and whether such additional postponement of a trial date would
serve the interests of all the parties.

The trial court determined

that no extension of the discovery deadline was necessary, and the
trial court's discretion should not be disturbed.
The second reason the trial court's decision should be
upheld is that, as to defendant Okubo, the motion to extend the
discovery deadline was not made in a timely fashion.

The

discovery cutoff occurred on December 11. The motion to extend
the discovery period as to defendant Okubo was made on December
23, at the summary judgment hearing.
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Even if it can be said that the denial of the
Butterfields' motion was an abuse of discretion, it is not grounds
to reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of
Dr. Okubo.

As is clear to anyone who reads the transcript of the

December 2 3 hearing, the primary reason the trial court granted
defendants' motion for summary

judgment is that the Butterfields

had failed to produce, as of the date set for hearing the motions
for summary judgment, competent expert testimony to rebut the
testimony provided by defendants.

That fact alone justified the

entry of summary judgment against the Butterfields -- whether or
not it might have been preferable to allow plaintiff additional
time to depose Dr. Okubo's expert witness.

The plaintiffs had

just as much time to come forward with competent expert testimony
as did defendants.

The propriety of the court's denial of the

Butterfields' motion to extend the discovery deadline is
completely independent of the propriety of the trial court's entry
of summary judgment.

A judgment should not be reversed unless

there is error that is substantial and prejudicial and of a nature
that without the error there would be a substantial likelihood of
a different result.

Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 56 3

P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977).

Granting the Butterfields additional time

to conduct discovery could not have helped the Butterfields after
the proper entry of summary judgment against them.

The Appellate

Court can only reverse the judgment of the trial court if there is
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have
been a result more favorable to the complaining party.
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Matter of

Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985).
CONCLUSION
The entry of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Okubo
against the Butterfields should be upheld.

The Butterfields failed

to resist Dr. Okubo's motion with competent medical evidence. Dr.
Jacobs' unsubstantiated claim that he "has experience" at a
children's hospital and his conclusory allegation that he is
"familiar" with the standard of care applicable to pediatricians in
1984 does not qualify as the affirmative showing of competence
required under Rule 56(e).

Dr. Jacobs' affidavit is also defective

because it fails to state that a general surgeon would have treated
Tiffany with the same procedures a pediatrician would employ, and
the affidavit fails to establish Dr. Jacobs' familiarity with the
local standard of care applicable to pediatricians in Utah and
similar localities.

Apart from the issue of the affidavit

demonstrating the requisite degree of competence, the trial court
also correctly refused to accept the testimony of Dr. Jacobs
because the affidavit was not timely served as is required under
the rules.

The trial court's determination that Dr. Jacobs was not

a competent expert or that the affidavit was not timely served does
not amount to an abuse of discretion.
In addition, the trial court's ruling that defendant's
alleged misconduct was not the proximate cause of the infant
plaintiff's death was proper given the evidence before the court.
Clearly, the remoteness in time from Dr. Okubo's treatment of the
child and her subsequent death, together with the lack of any
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competent medical testimony presented by plaintiffs that there was
any deviation from the standard of care, is enough to support the
court's ruling.

Even if the finding of proximate cause was in

error, independent grounds exist to support the summary judgment.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to grant the additional discovery period.

In the

alternative, if it was error not to continue the discovery period,
there are again independent grounds to support the award of
summary judgment to defendants.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment
granted to defendant Dr. Okubo should be affirmed.
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ADDENDUM "A"

23
Q

It was never raised by you?

A

No, because I was told at the hospital she was

developing a breathing pattern and they made me feel like such
a fool for taking her in there when she quit breathing, that I
thought I was being foolish to even ask about it.
Q

Did Dr. Okubo ever raise the subject with you of

A

No.

Q

Did you tell him of the incident that occurred on

SIDS?

July 4?
A
hospital.
Q

He was aware of it. They called him from the
I called him the next day, also.
But did you, at this visit on the 16th, did you

actually tell him about what had happened?
A

Yes. We discussed it shortly.

I mostly discussed

it with the nurse.
Q

What did he tell you he believed the problem was?

A

She was creating a breathing pattern.

Q

And not to worry about it?

A

Not to worry.

Q

Was that the end of the conversation?

A

Yes.

Q

Have you seen him since that date?

A

July 16?

Q

July 16.

rnwwwp]?T7.P.D

TRANSCRIPT

24
A

No, I haven't.

Q

You didn't take her back in to see him again at all,

A

No.

Q

Why not?

A

Because I felt he was careless.

Q

What caused you to feel that he was careless?

A

Because I was in one door and out the other. There

then?

was two doors on the examining room and they ushered you in
one room and out the other, like an assembly line. That's how
I felt.
Q

So you made a conscious decision at that time not to

go back and see him?
A

Yes, I was going to look for another physician.

Q

And did you?

A

I found one —

yeah, I looked and I found another

physician at the end of August.
Q

Who was that?

A

Dr., McClellan.

Q

I guess the next date that really comes up with

regard to July is the July 4 incident; is that correct?

You

said that you told Dr. Okubo about the breathing problem on
July 4?
A

Yes.

Q

Tell us what happened on July 4.

rnMPTTTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

ADDENDUM "B

1
2

Q.

I understand that you did see Tiffany Butterfield

You are referring to your office records now, I assume.

3

A.

Yes, I am.

4

Q.

Could you tell me when you first saw her?

5

A.

I first saw her on August the 31st, 1984.

6

Q.

When you saw her, did her morher give you any

7

kind of history?

8

A.

Normally you always take a history.

9

Q.

Can you tell me, then, what history you were

10
11

provided with at that time?
A.

That she was a normal birth, seven pounds,

12

eighteen and a half-inch baby, that had no difficulty

13

with pregnancy, that the chief complaint at that time

14

was she had a rash, or she had a whitish material on

15

the inside of her mouth, and that was a thrush and that

16

was treated.

17

Q.

18

Did she mention at this time any apnea or problem.^

with breathing?

19

A.

No.

20

Q,

Did she mention any problems at all besides

21

the rash?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Did you then schedule just a routine follow

24
25

up or did she call the next time she was to visit you?
A.

I would have normally scheduled a follow up.

7.

1

I don't recall whether I asked her to return specifically

2

or whether that was her own idea, but I normally would

3

have asked her to come back and then to start her

4

immunization schedule.

5
6

ft

of listlessness?

7
8

A.
ft

9
tO

No.
In Tiffany?

A.
ft

11
12

Did she report on this first visit any complaint

NoOr congestion?

A.
ft

No.
What were your impressions, if you can remember?

13

A.

14

oral thrush.

15
16
17

ft

Just that she was a healthy baby and she had

When you saw her the next time, can you tell

us the date and what your findings were.
A.

It was 9-27-84.

Basically it was the same

18

thing, it was

normal well baby examination.

Her head,

19

ears, nose, eyes and throat were within normal limits.

20

Fontanel

21

infection, intraorally was recovering with the microstatin

22

I had given her.

23

No abdominal masses, umbilicus was healed.

24

no hip click.

25

were given that day and she was scheduled for return

was normal, the tear ducts were open, the yeast

Her chest was clear, normal sinus rhythm.

Feet were normal.

No hernia,

DPT and oral polio

1
2
3

at two months.
Q.

At this time was it your understanding that

you were this child's primary physician?

4

A.

As far as I knew,

5

Q.

Was it your understanding that she was seeing

6

you exclusively or did you know whether she was seeing

7

other physicians, or did you know either way?

8

A.

I don't recall, honestly.

9

Q.

Do you recall on this second office visit having

10
11
12
13

any discussions regarding apnea, congestion?
A.

She didn't relate that the child was having

any difficulties like that.
Q.

I won't go into the specific office visits.

14

I also have a copy of your records but I did want to

15

ask you a couple of questions about it.

16
17

Were you also seeing the mother at this time
as a patient?

18

A.

Yes, I believe I was.

19

Q.

Do you recall seeing her in c.he emergency room

20
21

during the same* period of time?
A.

It would have been about the same period of

22

time but I don't have my records in front of me.

23

tell you exactly which date.

I can't

24

Q.

You don't have the records for the mother?

25

A.

Well, that wasn't what we were supposed to

1

talk about today.

2

and s o —

I thought it was just about Tiffany

3

Q.

Those are the only records you have?

4

A.

I could get them but, I haven't reviewed them

5
6
7

or anything like that s o —
Q.

We will stick with Tiffany just to stay sequential)

then, and then we could talk about the mother more later.

8 J

A.

Okay.

9

Q.

So your understanding, then, you saw the child

10

six times; is that correct?

11

A.

Actually I believe I saw the child—

12

Q.

Five.

13

A.

Five times.

14

Q.

Because the December 22nd visit was just with

15

the mother?

16

A.

Yes, it was.

17

Q.

And during these five visits from August until

Excuse me.

18

December, did the mother mention anything to you about

19

problems with breathing, or problems with congestion,

20

or listlessness, discoloration, any of those things?

21

A.

Yes, on one occasion.

I'm sorry.

Two occasions.

22

She told me on November the 5th that the child had been

23

having some mucus in her nose and that was treated.

24
25

I thought she had a serous otitis media
when I saw her back on the 30th

and

that had resolved.

10

1

I did see her again on the 14th of December

2

and she related that the child had mucus in her upper

3

respiratory tract.

4

so I reinstituted it, and then I did not see her after

5

that.

6
7

Q.

The previous treatment had been effecti\j

Could you tell me from your notes

what was the previous treatment?

The Rondec?

8

A.

Rondec, DM.

9

Q.

And so you continued it because—

10

A.

It recurred.

1!

Q.

It recurred.

12

on the 14th

Because it had resolved it by

the 30th?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And could you explain to me what SOM is again?

15

A.

Serous otitis media.

16

Q.

And what is that?

17

A.

That is where you have fluid behind the ear

18
19
20
21

but it is not of an infectious nature.
Q.

And was the condition complained of on the

14th the same thing; SOM, or was it something different?
A.

No. That was what she had on that one occasion

22

on the 5th of November and on the 14th of December that

23

was not present.

24

Q.

And the complaint of the 14th was just—

25

A.

That the mucus was present in her nose.

1

than the records?

2

k

No, sir.

3

a

And the information given to you by the parents?

4

k

No, sir.

5

a

Okay.

6

Let me ask one more thing.

on this whole deal.

I am hazy

Have you been retained as an expert

7 i witness to testify for Mr. Grindstaff?
8

k

Not that I know of.

9

a

Has he asked you to testify in court in this

10

matter?

11

MR. GRINDSTAFF:

12

THE WITNESS:

I have never talked to him.

I have never met him before or talked

13

to him on the phone, and so, no, I have not been retained

14

as an expert in the case.

15
16
17

a

(By Mr. Garner)

And so have the plaintiffs

asked yo u to testify in their behalf?
k

They asked if I would be willing to do that

18

and I said, "Why don't you see how the case goes along

19

for you, and this might be something that is going to

20

be settled out of court.

21

I will, but let's not cross bridges before—"

22

MR. GARNER:

23

MRS . BRENNAN:

I think that is all I have.
I have a couple more.
EXAMINATION

24
25

If absolutely necessary, yes,

BY MRS. BRENNAN:

Q. Are you still seeing Mrs. Butter-

47.

ADDENDUM "C"
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R. Scott Williams, #3498
STRONG & HANNI
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Sixth Floor Boston Building
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BY
OErl/TY CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians
and parents of and on
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH
BUTTERFIELD,

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS W.
NIELSON, M.D., PH.D.

Plaintiffs,
Civil No.

-vsDAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL,
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5,

C86-9250

Judge Richard Moffatt

Defendants.
-oooOoooSTATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

ss.

Dennis W. Nielson, M.D., Ph.D., being first duly sworn
on oath deposes and states:
1.

I am a physician licensed to practice in the State

of Utah, having a specialty in pediatric medicine.

I am

a board certified pediatrician and am presently an assistant
professor of pediatrics at the Department of Pediatrics at
the University of Utah Medical Center.

Of particular interest

ocjoos:
UJ

to this case involving a claimed sudden infant death syndrome,
I am board certified in pediatric pulmonology a«d am presently
the director of the Pediatric Pulmonary Function Laboratory
at the University of Utah Hospital and Primary Children's
Medical Center.

I am also a member of the Sudden Infant

Death Advisory Council of the Utah State Department of Health.
A complete summary of my expertise and qualifications is
included within the attached Curriculum Vitae to this affidavit.
2.

At the request of counsel for Dr. David Okubo, I

have reviewed the medical records of the deceased infant.
Tiffany Ruth Butterfield, and the depositions of Albert John
and Angela Butterfield.
3.

That I am familiar with the standard of care required

of a pediatrician for treatntent of the symptoms as reported
to Dr. Nickol and Dr. Okubo by the plaintiffs on July 4,
and July 16, 1984.
4.

That after a thorough review of the medical records

and the depositions involved in this case I am of the opinion
that Dr. Okubo did not deviate from the standard of care
required of him in the treatment rendered to the deceased
infant through July 16, 1984.
5.

More specifically, even if Dr. Okubo was told by

Mrs. Butterfield of the incident that allegedly occurred
on July 4, 1984, and that was referred to in her deposition,
I am still of the opinion that Dr. Okubo would not have been
-2-
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required to order or suggest a home monitor, assuming as
plaintiff has testified that there had only been the one
incident prior to seeing Dr. Okubo and that the child was
breathing normally and appeared healthy when finally presented
to the emergency room on July 4, 1984, and also when presented
to Dr. Okubo on July 16, 1984. Although some physicians
may choose to order a home monitor for circumstances similar
to what the plaintiffs reported occurred on July 4, 1984,
the standard of care would clearly not have required Dr.
Okubo to order one or refer the patient to another physician
who would do so.
6.

In addition, even if Dr. Okubo had ordered a home

monitor there is insufficient data or literature available
to conclude with medical probability that it would have prevented
this particular infant's death.
Further affiant saith naught.
DATED this i Q ^ day of December, 1987.

Dennis W. Nielson, M.D., Ph.D.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this lQth day of December,
1987.

^J^^ttd^tt?1--

•tary Public - Resi
Leona K. Hollingsworth
Bountiful, UT
My Commission E x p i r e s :
April 25, 1991.
-3-
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on this ipj^ day of December,
1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
hand delivered to:
David L. Grindstaff, Esq,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
395 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
David W. Slagle, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys for Defendant Holy
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Gary D. Stott, Esq.
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Attorneys for Defendnat Nickol
50 South Main Street, #700
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465

Wendy H.N Smart; Secretary
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ADDENDUM "D

/X/A//87Z
IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT 0? SALT LAX2 COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians
and parents of and on
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH
BUTTERFIELD,

AFFIDAVIT OP H. BARRY
JACOBS, M.D.

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

Civil No.

DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL,
ar.d HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5,

C36-9250

Judge Richard Moffatt

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

ss.

H. Barry Jacobs, M.D., being first duly sworn on oath
deposes and states:
1. I am a physician licensed in the State of Maryland
and am a Board Certified Surgeon since 1974. **-ha»e *part
experience in Emergency Room care at four hospitaj.1, and
Pediatrics, having cared for patient's in'priya^f practlcjT^nd
hospitals, *fw^T!^T»,p»H^<n.4^,^»^n*«p4lni in Bilhifaflt?TTi D.C.
2. I have reviewed the emergency room and pediatric
records of the Decedent, Tiffiany R. Butterfield, as well as the
depositions of her Parents, Albert and Angela Butterfield, and
have met with Albert Butterfield.
3. I am familiar with the Standard of Care, applicable
in 1984, required in pediatrics and emergency room medicine, as
well as hospital responsibility for adequate record keeping and
availability of previous records during later follow up care for
a related complaint.
4. After a thorough review of the available data I am of
the opinion that care below an acceptable standard was provided
to Tiffany Butterfield by Dr. Nichol, Dr. Okubo, and the Holy
Cross Jordan Valley Hospial with the specifics related below.

5. Assuming the facts as related in the parent's
depositions to be true, the history of present illness and/or
chief complaints gathered by the hospital nursing staff and Dr.
Nichols on 07/04/84 fail to detail the fact that actual apnea was
observed by the parents and there was cyanosis* Also omitted was
the fact that the child required stimulation such as pinching or
shaking before respiration was resumed. Given the lack of
significant findings on exam to account for respiratory
compromise and/or the apparent concern and anxiety of the
paints, such an omission contributed directly to the failure to
consider SIDS in a differential diagnosis.
6. When the child was taken as directed for pediatric
evaluation on 07/16/84 by Dr. Okubo a vague reference was made
concerning the fact that the child did have unexplained
respiratory problems. Once again, an inadequate history lead to
an incomplete assessment and second failure to consider the need
to rule out SIDS as an etiological possibility.
7. The second emergency room visit of 08/16/84 did
contain a somewhat unclear reference to periods of apnea not
associated with cyanosis. This is refuted by the parent's
deposition in that the child had been observed to have cyanosis
with the apnea and once again required stimulation while being
transported to the hospital that did -resolve the cynosis.
8. It is alleged that the prior emergency room record of
07/04/84 could not be obtained* £*ch data- should have been
available. This would have reinforced the fact that unexplained
respiratory problems existed and a differential diagnosis
including SIDS should have been developed.
9. The physical exam as recorded by Dr. Nichols on
08/16/84 failed to note any cardiac findings. The discharge
instructions did imply some need for monitoring the infant and
that the child should be re-evaluated by the Pediatrician. The
child's pa-rents insist they did not receive any follow-up
recommendations and therefore were unaware of the need for same.
10. There are no records available to detail what was
recorded during a third emergency room visit on or about
10/01/84. Theparent's deposition £«i*cates the child again had
an apneic'episode and required stimulation. The deposition goes
on to insist that a concern about SIDS was raised and discounted
by Dr. Nichols as a possibility even though no other etiology had
surfaced to explain-the child's problems or account for the
degree of parental concern and/or anxiety.
11. On 12/19/84 Tiffany Butterfield did indeed die from
SIDS. This would easily have been avoided to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty by either in-hospital observation and
monitoring for apnea followed by the Issuance of a home apnea
monitor, or simply arranging for a -home apnea monitor.

12. While one could perhaps argue that such care was not
warrented following the 07/04/84 emergency visit, I am of the
opinion that such care was justified after the 07/16/84 pediatric
check-up and/or the 08/16/84 and 10/01/84 emergency room visits.
Drs« Okubo and Nichols and a duty to insure necessary follow-up
was carried out and failed to do so.
13. The above, in my opinion, constitutes care below an
accepted standard (negligence) and was the proximate cause of the
child's demise from SIDS.
Further affiant saith naught.
DATED this^I

day of December, 1987.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this J2j^
December, 1987.

day of

Notary Public - Residing at:
Faye Araaim
Reston, VA
My Commission Expires:
tty Commission Expires May 11 !M9

